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What is the role of foresight, and the significance of the lack of
foresight under uncertainty, in the theory of business cycles? What relevant
evidence on these questions can be extracted from thesurvey data on agents'
expectations and experts' forecasts? Th provide some answers, the recent work
in this area is reviewed in the perspective of economic and doctrinalhis-.
tory. The address proceeds from (1) a discussion of the expectationalaspects
of modern business cycles theories and (2) a critique of thecurrently domi-
nant approaches to (3) a summary of the evidence and (4) some illustrations
and implications for further analysis. Of the conclusions drawn,perhaps the
most general one is that expectations matter a great deal but are not all—
important. They may be rational in the sense of effectively using the limited
available knowledge and information, but they are also diversified and not
always self—validating or stabilizing.
Victor Zarnowitz
Professor of Economic and Finance
University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
(312) 962—7130BUSINESS CYCLE ANALYSIS AND (PECTATIONAL SURVEY DATA
Thispaper is part of a project in progress, which attempts to survey the
recent work on business cycles in historical perspective. It concentrates on
one set of phenomena in the complex story of this main form of economic insta-
bility and its interpretations: What is the role of foresight and the lack
thereof under uncertainty in the theory of business cycles? What is the
evidence from survey data on expectations and forecasts? The subject is broad
and the work is far from finished, but some provisional results seem worth
reporting.
The paper has four substantive parts. Section 1 discusses the expecta—
tional aspects of modern business cycle theories. Section 2 reviews the
criticisms of the treatment of expectations. Section 3 summarizes the
evidence. Section 4 provides some illustrations from my own empirical work.
1.Expectations in the TheoryofBusinessCycles
The "Konjunkturgebundenheit" of contemporary economic thinking, i.e., its
dependence on whether prosperous or depressed business conditions prevail, is
in itself an arqument in favor of the importance of the "psychological factor"
(Haberler, 1964, p. 471 n.) Of the classics of business cycle literature,
Pigou (1927, esp. chs. VI and VII) is most prominently associated with the
theory that, under uncertainty, interdependent expectations of businessmen
generate widespread errors of optimism in expansions and of pessimism in
contractions. It is well known but still noteworthy that, for all their
differences, Keynes (1936, esp. chs. 11, 12, 15 and 22) shared with Pigou the
emphasis on these processes of error diffusion, discovery, and reversal. Later
much further attention was given to the role of attitudes and expectations in
business decisions (Hart, 1940; Shackle, 1949), consumer behavior (Katona,-2—
1951; Juster, 1964), and the "contagious" cumulative processesof the business
cycle (J6hr 1952). Recently, strigel (1981) examinedthe results of the Ifo
business outlook surveys from a similar point of view.
During business expansions, most series on output, employment, real
income, and spending, etc., increase so that "good news" dominateand their
cumulation fosters optimism; during business contractions, the opposite
happens. This is simply a consequence of the persistence and pervasivenessof
the fluctuations and not necessarily a source. To he possibly invalid and
provoke disagreement, a theory of the "psychological" type must arguethat
errors of excessive optimism (pessimism) play a major independent partin
generating booms (slumps). Thus, prospective profits are being overestimated
for some reason in certain periods and such errors spread and grow until dis-
covered in the markets for the "overproduced" goods and replaced for a time by
similarly infectious and partly self-validating underpredictions. For the
classics, access to more and better information on industry fortunes would help
reduce individual forecast errors and their cumulation; for Keynes, this could
not help much, since there is little knowledge on which expectations of the
future yield from investment could draw.1
The first generation of formal theoretical models of cycles in aggregate
output slighted the expectational factors. This is true of the stochastic,
linear, and stable models (Frisch, 1933) and the deterministic, nonlinear, and
unstable ones (Hicks, 1950). But soon a reaction set in against the theories
of the latter type. The dangers of volatile market psychology, investment
collapse, etc., no longer loomed large in the midst of worldwide expansionand
1Such knowledge is "usually very slight and often negligible" and so the
expectations "being based on shifting and unreliable evidence ... are
subject to sudden and violent changes" (Keynes, 1936, pp. 149 and 315). Cf.
Alfred Marshall, Money, Credit, and Commerce, Macmillan, London, 1923, pp.
260—261, and Pigou, op. cit., pp. 66—69.—3—
growing prosperity, even though "Keynesian" ideas were still ascendant. There
was renewed recognition of the plurality of causes and diversity of elements in
the individual business cycles (Duesenberry, 1958). New influential theories
cast expectations in prominent roles and at the same time imputed much more
stability to the private sector than Keynes and his early followers did. The
permanent income and life cycle hypotheses made consumption forward—looking
rather than merely reactive, broadly wealth—dependent rather than income—
constrained (Friedman, 1957; Ando and Modigliani, 1963). The evolution of the
investment function also pointed to the importance of longer—term expected
("permanent") output (Eisner, 1978, ch. 4), while relying as well on relative
price variables such as the rental costs of capital (Jorgenson, 1963). All
these developments reduced the perceived significance of the accelerator—
multiplier interaction and the associated cumulative movements making for
instability.
The original monetarist theory which challenged Keynesian economics in the
1960s asserts that changes in the supply of money are the main determinant of
changes in nominal income. The long—run version of this hypothesis reduces to
the old quantity theory of how trends in money produce trends in prices, but
there is much less clarity and agreement about the nature and direction of the
money—income relation in the short run. Here one critical element is a
relatively stable demand function for real money balances. The other is lags
in wage and price adjustments, which arise because expectations are taken to be
"adaptive," that is, backward—lookinq and involving gradual learning from, and
correction of, past errors. Given both these conditions, autocorrelated dis-
turbances in the form of alternating sequences of high and low monetary growth
rates produce, via changes in expected relative prices and rates of return,
fluctuations in aggregate demand and real economic activity, i.e., business—4—
cycles or growth cycles. The critical monetary impulses are treated as exogen—
ous and mainly policy induced. The "feedback" influence from business activity
to monetary growth is not analytically developed and integrated into a theory
of how money, prices, and real factors interact in the short run. Instead,
this is an essentially exogenous and monetary theory (Friedman and Schwartz
1963 a and b).
Under adaptive expectations (AE) short—term money changes are implicitly
viewed as unanticipated and so are for some time the associated price changes.
For example, people will tend to underestimate the rising prices caused by a
sudden acceleration of monetary growth and hence overestimate their real money
balances. This will induce portfolio adjustments in response to the altered
relative prices or yields on a broad range of assets and then more transitory
spending on goods and services to liquidate the extra amounts of "redundant"
money. In the process, interest rates will first decline but then snap back as
spending, income, and prices rise, overshooting the new equilibrium paths.
This transmission process is seen as involving variable but on the average
lengthy lags. As the adjustments in the price level are incomplete and those
in wages may be particularly sluggish, employment and output react in a
cyclical manner.
According to the "natural rate" hypothesis (Friedman, 1968; Phelps, 1967)
the deviations of output, employment, and unemployment from their equilibrium
levels can occur only if and as long as the expected rates of inflation differ
from the actual ones. However, such differences are eliminated only in an ill—
defined "long run," which in this context is often treated as if it meant "on
the average over the business cycle." The process of discovery and elimination
of the price forecast errors is sluggish in a world of frequent monetary and
real shocks, in which it is difficult to distinguish signals from noise, that—5--
is, absolute from relative price changes and persistent from temporary
movements.
In the more recent equilibrium models, the hypothesis of AE is replaced by
that of rational expectations (RE). Here expectations are basically like pre-
dictions of the relevant and valid economic theory: free of any bias and
subject to random errors only (Muth, 1961; Lucas, 1972). Economic behavior is
guided by subjective probabilities which on the average agree with the observed
frequencies of the events in question. These frequencies have predictive
value, the processes to which they refer being assumed stable and known from
past learning experience. Unlike in Knight, 1921, or Keynes, 1936, there is no
uncertainty here as to what the applicable objective probability disturbances
are or whether they do in fact exist in any usable form.
Under RE, all persistent monetary changes, inasmuch as they are predict-
able, will be correctly anticipated and met directly by proportional changes in
prices and related nominal variables. Only random monetary impulses can lead
to surprises and miscalculations which, in this view, are necessary to explain
any cyclical movements in real variables. It is the resulting errors in price
expectations, which must themselves be random and short-lived, that act as the
proximate cyclical impulses in this class of models.
It is assumed that economic agents have timely and complete information
about their own markets but only incomplete or lagged information about other
"island" markets (Phelps, 1970) and about the economy—wide aggregates such as
the money stock and the overall price level. Supply and demand depend on per-
ceived changes in a broad set of real variables, but that set is in practice
limited to relative prices only. All agents are effectively treated as price
takers, so quantity signals are disregarded. Suppliers compare their current
price and wage opportunities with the expected (discounted future) opportun-—6—
ities and react positively to the excess of the former over the latter. These
intertemporal substitution effects are typically elastic, reflecting strong
competitive incentives to take advantage of temporarily higher real rates of
return. Now a general price rise due to an unanticipated monetary stimulus is
misperceived by agents as signaling increases in relative prices, which prompts
simultaneous upward adjustments of output and employment throughout the econ-
omy. Only in time, after having made their decisions, will the agents discover
that their relative price estimates were distorted as prices rose in other
markets as well. A retrenchment will then follow. When prices unexpectedly
fall or, which is more likely in our times, the actual inflation rates decline
below the anticipated rates, misperceptions of the opposite sign are predicted
to occur, which again will not be recognized and cleared up until they have
caused a retardation or recession in real economic activity. Thus these
theories rest on several strong, maintained hypotheses: intertemporal
substitution on the supply side, rational expectations, and lags of information
(Lucas, 1975, 1977; Sargent and Wallace, 1976; Sargent, 1976; Barro, 1980).
The first generation of the RE models assumed flexibility of all prices
and continuous clearing of all markets, including the labor market; they also
implied the impotence of any monetary stabilization policy that is nonranclom
and capable of being anticipated. These propositions are highly controversial
and some critics regard them as entirely inconsistent with basic facts about
the economy (Arrow, 1978; Solow, 1980; Tobin, 1977). flnpirical studies of
intertemporal substitution show that it is difficult to test this hypothesis
directly; the evidence is mixed but for the most part unfavorable (Lucas and
Rapping, 1969; Hall, 1980; Altonji, 1982; Altonji and Ashensfelter, 1980; Clark
and Summers, 1979; Mankiw, Rotemberg, and Summers, 1982). The voluminous
theoretical and empirical work on price determination and labor contracts—7—
identifies a number of reasons why prices and wages adjust gradually to changes
in aggregate demand (Azariadis, 1975; Baily, 1974; Gordon,1981; Okun, 1981).
Some of the more recent RE models reflect these developments by introducing
contracts which predetermine the course of wages over some future time period
(Phelps and Taylor, 1977; Fischer, 1977; Taylor, 1980; 1982 McCallum, 1982).
Other models with RE retain continuous market clearing but rely largely or
exclusively on real, not monetary, disturbances to explain business
fluctuations (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Black, 1982; King and Plosser, 1982;
Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Long and Plosser, 1983). The issues addressed in all
these diverse studies are important for the analysis of business cycles but
must be omitted from consideration in this paper which is limited to a single
aspect of this work, namely the treatment of agents' expectations. The related
problem of the accuracy of experts' forecasts will be noted later.
2. Critique
RE constitute the most common element in the recent theoretical work on
business cycles at least in the U.S., and there is wide agreement that their
use as a technical model—building principle has led to important developments
andnewinsights, notably in the criticism of some aspects of macroeconometric
modelsand the analysis of competitive markets with imperfect information
(Lucas, 1976; Poole, 1976). Economics has always implicitly accepted the RE
hypothesis inthe analysis of steady states or stable market prototypes, where
allactive participants must be presumedto know the processes involved.
RE can be viewed as a condition of stochastic equilibrium, but general
equilibrium theorists raise a number of sweeping objections against its
application to macroeconomic dynamics (see Arrow, Solow, and Tobin).
Contingent future markets are conspicuous by their absence. Information is—8—
limited and unevenly diffused. The subjective probability distributions
underlying the forecasts of the individual decision—makers differ. No one can
predict the evolution of other people's expectations. The counter-argument is
that such criticisms, though they may be observationally correct, are not
helpful. Some apply to more than the RE models and would preclude much
innovative (though of necessity highly aggregative and abstract) theorizing
(Lucas, 1981). Some neglect the many advances in the understanding and
applications of the RE method, e.g., to the problem of diffuse or "asym-
metrical" information (S. Grossman, 1981).
The fundamental difficulty is not with the rationality of costly infor-
mation uses, which it is only reasonable to assume, but with the availability
of sufficient information, which certainly cannot be taken for granted. Two
assumptions underlie what may be called the strong version of the REH:(1)
that market incentives and penalties enforce continually and everywhere
optimal, i.e., cost—efficient predictions, and (2) that economic agents
generally possess adequate knowledge (data and models) so that their optimal
predictions are at least unbiased (in practice, such knowledge should make most
forecasts reasonably accurate). while (1) is presumably often well approxi-
mated, there seem to he no good a priori reasons why (2) should be always and
everywhere true. It is the claim of general validity of the REH in its strong
form (which is implicit in the macro—models built on this hypothesis) that many
economists believe is greatly overstated.
The equilibrium RE models contain no learning processes: they assume that
agents have already learned all that they can know about the probability dis-
tributions they face. This fits best a stochastically stationary environment
that has persisted long enough for people to have acquired the knowledge of its
operation. Learning is impeded in a stochastic nonstationary environment, even—9—
without structural change, since nonstationaryprocesses come in many varieties
and may interact in complicatedways. Moreover, actions based on incorrect
beliefs how the economy works cause outcomesthat may themselves be misleading.
Some authors have argued that the learningprocess, even if optimal in some
(e.g., least squares) sense, may notconverge to the rational_expectations
equilibrium; however, convergence has beenproven by others for some relatively
simple situations. In any event, during thelearning process, optimal predic-
tions may be approximated by adaptiveexpectations (AE) with varying correction
coefficients (Taylor, 1975; B. Friedman, 1979).
In a nonstationary world with structuralchanges and a mixture of random
and autocorrelated disturbances,uncertainty in the sense of Knight and Keynes
is prevalent. Here AE based on"experience," i.e., the observed frequencies of
past events modified in the light of recentchanges, will often prove unreli-
able, but they are apt to include the bulk of theavailable information.(of
course, optimal predictions will also incorporateany genuine information about
the future, e.g., credible news onprospective policy actions and domestic and
foreign economic trends, but such inputs are in shortsupply.) The amount of
valuable insight that can thus be obtainedmay be quite limited, but anyone who
uses it the best way he can in actionsconcerning the inherently uncertain
future would conform to a common sensedefinition of rational behavior.
A closely related argument is thatuncertainty is associated with varia-
tions in nonstationary means resulting from"permanent" changes in levels or
growth rates; in contrast, transitory, randomdeviations around stable trends
are connected with calculable risk.Uncertainty is held to be essential to the
persistence of cyclical contractions and thecurrent RE models err in ignoring
it. They should allow permanentchanges to occur but not to he identified
immediately. Stochastic shocks in the markets forcommodities, money, and—10—
labor contain in each case a permanent and a transitory component. The two
cannot be reliably separated: new information reduces but does not eliminate
the confusion. The rational response to the shocks takes the form of gradual
adjustments of beliefs about the permanent values of the endogenous variables,
since the structure of information is such that adaptive or distributed-lag
predictions are optimal (Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer 1980; Meltzer, 1982).
3. Evidence
Consider testing for the "rationality" of any set of expectations or fore-
casts. Several related criteria have been formulated arid used. Let X be
the actual value and he the forecast of xmade at the time t -j.
jt
t
Then the common test of unbiasedness is that the regression
(1) x =a. +b.X +u. t j J jt jt
should yield estimates of the coefficients a and b that are not signif-
icantly different from zero and one, respectively. This test is weak, since RE
are not merely free of systematic error but also efficient in the use of all
relevant information, 't—j ; the strict requirement is that
(2) EX=E(XtII.)
where Eisthe expected value operator.
However, condition (2) is too general to he testable. The set 1_ must
be restricted and identified. For expectations or forecasts made regularly or
by a replicable method, 'tj includes importantly the past errors knowable to
the source of •Herethe requirement is that there be no significant
autocorrelation among the errors ut which could have been exploited to
improve X .Thusrationality can be rejected by the evidence of either bias
or serially correlated residual errors or both. Of course, RE imply the equal-—11—
ityof mean actual and predicted values; if
(as, b) =(0,1) and
E(ut)
=0,E(Xt)—E(x)
Anotherefficiency testis to check whether thesurvey data reflect the
autoregressive properties of the variable inquestion. For example, let j= 1
andcompare the regressions
(3) X = + and =x.
+
Forthe expectation errors to beorthogonal, i.e., uncorrelated with the infor-
mation available from the past history ofX, c must equal for all i.
Forecasts are often made in each successiveperiod for several periods
ahead. In this case, a test ofconsistency of such forecasts (or expectations)
is available. Consider, forexample,
(4) = +
i=21 tj+
Hererationality requires that = for all i.
These tests have, of course, acommon core and logic; they are simply dif-
ferent ways of checking on theproperties of expectations conditionalupon a
certain set of information. Ifany exogenous variables generatingx can be
identified, further tests can be made tosee whether their predictive poweris
fully reflected in
Recent work using survey data has beenpreoccupied with tests for the
rationality of inflation expectations. The
most frequently used U.S. series
are the one-step and two—steps aheadgroup average predictions from semiannual
surveys of economic forecasters conducted since
1947 by Joseph A. Livingston, a
syndicated financial columnist.
The balance of the evidence is thatthese data reject the REHaccording to
at least some of the above tests.Thus failures to meet the criteria ofeffi——12—
ciency and/or consistency are reported by Pesando(1975) and Carison (1977),
failures to pass the unbiasedness tests by Wachtel (1974)and Gramlich,
(1979). pearce (1979) shows that univariate time—series(ARIMA) models would
have predicted inflation better than the Livingston averagesdid, which also
contradicts the rationality of the latter. Tests of individualforecasts
predominantly fail the unbiasedness tests, confirmingand amplifying the
evidence for the aggregate forecasts, as shown by Figlewskiand Wachtel
(1981). Moore (1977b) notes the pronounced tendency of the Livingston averages
to lag behind the actual inflation series. Most of the negativeresults relate
to the 1970s, a decade of particularly large unpredictableinflationary shocks,
but the earlier Livingston surveys do not fare much better. Morefavorable
tests are reported by Mullineaux (1978).
Claims have been made that households predict inflation on the whole"more
rationally" than economic and business forecasters, but the comparisonsseem
strained and inconclusive. The evidence comes from surveys of consumeratti-
tudes which over time have dealt mainly with the direction, notthe size, of
the expected price changes. Some of the studies find that the hypothesisof
unbiasedriess cannot be rejected for these data, others merely thatit is "not
so decisively rejected" as the inflation forecasts byeconomists and business
executives (Juster, 1979; Huizinga, 1980; Curtin, 1982; deLeeuw and McKelvey,
1981; Gramlich, 1983).,2 The conclusion that various surveys of price
expectations produce as a rule mixed results, with a disturbingly large
proportion of rejections, applies to European and Japanese aswell as U.S. data
(Aiginger, 1981; Papadia, 1982).
Relatively few authors have tested expectations data for variablesother
thaninflation.For many early forecasts of U.S. aggregative series (GNP, con—
2The quotation on text is from Gramlich, 1983, p. 163.—13—
sumption expenditures, business outlays on plant and equipment, and industrial
production in the 1950s and 1960s), there is evidence of significant bias
(Mincer and Zarnowjtz, 1969). The most common pattern is underestimation of
growth, i.e., of levels in upward-trending series, and somewhat less frequently
of cyclical changes in general (Theil, 1958; Zarnowitz, 1967). Thereare
indications of adaptive learning behavior, with forecast revisions whichare a
fraction of the observed error (the smaller the longer thespan of the forecast
error). The AE models go back to the 1950s and have been used withsome
success in empirical research; whether they are "ad hoc" or, on thecontrary,
entirely "rational," depends on the structure and uncertainty of the available
information (Cagari, 1956; Nerlove, 1958; Mincer, 1969; Frenkel,1975; Mussa,
1975; Meltzer, 1982).
Sales anticipations of U.S. manufacturing firms have been on the whole
negatively assessed by Hirsch and Lovell (1969), more positively by Pashigian
(1964) and Irvine (1981). The latter study finds that the datapass most of
the rationality tests before 1973 but not thereafter, and considersthe
possibility of a structural change associated with the first OPEC oil price
shock. However, these Commerce data were discontinued in 1976.
Underestimation of the mean actual change for 29 out of 39 variables
covered is reported in a recent comprehensive compilation of testson expec—
tational survey data from several countries (Aiginger, 1981). Theseare
surveys of businessmen covering a variety of operational variables (sales,
orders, production, investment, inventories, selling prices); ofconsumers,
concerning prices and financial situation; and of business analysts and
economists, relating to GNP and its major components and the major price
indexes. The prevalence of underprediction ofaverage changes is attributed to
asymmetries in the loss functions of economic agents: the loss from—14—
overoptimistic expectations tends to be larger than that for overpessimistic
expectations. Given these asymmetries, the apparent biases in the surveydata
are themselves "rational" (on losses from forecasting errors, see Theil, 1958;
Brainard, 1967; Waud, 1976; Johansen, 1980).
The strongest evidence favorable to RE comes from the literature on
"efficient markets" for financial assets and commodities. This is readily
understandable since these are well—organized competitive auction markets with
full price flexibility, where traders deal largely in standardized instruments,
transaction costs are low, and prompt and general collection and dissemination
of the information is vital and constitutes a central part of the functioning
of the market itself (Fama, 1970; Poole, 1976). Nevertheless, in this area,
too, some test results unfavorable to the REH have been reported, namelyfor
the interest rate forecasts surveyed in the Goldsmith-Nagan Bond and Money
Letter. These are forecasts of representative interest rates one and two
quarters ahead, made by active market participants. They were found tobe in
large part not unbiased or efficient and not always consistent (B. Friedman,
1980).
However, survey data reflect average expectations whereas what matters in
the marketplace are the expectations of marginal buyers and sellers. If the
most resourceful participants succeed in eliminating unexpected profit oppor-
tunities, the market will behave in a way consistent with the REN, although
many, perhaps even most, of the traders do not. Mishkin (1981)constructs
forecasts of interest rate and inflation from bond market data and provides
tests that fail to reject the rationality of the market interest rate
forecasts. This is taken to suggest that "the Goldsmith—Nagafl survey measures
•.• arenot an accurate description of the actual bond market forecasts" in
the period 1959—69 (ibid., p. 300). But the concurrent bond—market predictions—15—
of inflation fail the rationality test, and Mishkin's argument that the 1960s
were an unusual historical period because of rising inflation is not really
persuasive. (The inflation forecasts in the 1970s seem generally worse yet, and
this decade was in many respects even more "unusual." Long periods of
tranquility are hard to find.)
Clearly, the evidence from the surveys has certain important limitations
and must be assessed with caution. But it is not good "positive economics" to
dismiss it on the ground that only theories, not their assumptions, can he
tested. Tests on the survey data focus on the issue of expectation formation.
Where direct observations on expectations or forecasts are not used, the
evidence generally consists of joint tests of an expectations hypothesis and
the particular model incorporating that hypothesis. Diverse and rich expecta-
tional survey data are now available and in need of much careful exploration.
Where independent tests based on such materials are in substantial agreement,
they have lessons to impart that should be taken seriously,
4. Some Illustrations and laplications for Cyclical Analysis
Table 1 collects the evidence on cyclical turning—point and directional
forecasts for U.S. income and output. The record of the annual end-of-year
predictions of GNP is quite good, that of the earlier mid-year predictions much
worse (section 1). However, few reversals occurred in this annual series
during the period covered. Directional changes over sequences of two
semiannual periods or four quarters are more frequent and much more difficult
to anticipate and indeed these forecasts have not been much better than
guesswork (sections 2 and 3). This and other evidence suggests that business
analysts and economists are often able to recognize turns near the time they
occur but not well ahead of the event (Zarnowitz, 1967 and 1968; Fels and
Hinshaw, 1968; Moore, 1969).—16—
Table1
Forecastsof Turning Points and Directions of Change
in GNP and Real GNP, 1947—1976.
1 •AnnualData, GNP, 1947—1965
Correct forecasts of Turning Points (TP) ___________________________________
as percentage of
All predicted TP 60 (42)
All actual TP 50 (35)
All periods covered 64 (51)
2. Semiannual Data, GNP, 1947—1964
Correct forecasts of directional change Semiannual Change Forecasts, 1947—64
as percentage of 0—6 months 6—12 months
All periods covered 73 (58) 62 (58)
3. Quarterly Data, GNP, 1959—1963
Quarter—to Quarter Change Forecasts, 1959—63
0—3 months 3—6 months6—9 months 9—12 months
69 (72) 82 (82)
4. Annual Data, Real GNP, 1959—1976
Mean Absolute Percentage of Total
NumberError, % Points Absolute Error
Underestimation errors
Overestimation errors
Turning point errors 8
NOTE: Forecasts or actual observations of no change are counted as half TP and half no
TP. Figures in parentheses are the expected values on the assumption of
independence and fixed marginal totals. The span 0—3 months refers tothe change
from the current quarter to the one ending three months hence; 3—6 months refers
to the change from quarter ending three months hence to the one ending six months
hence; etc.
SOURCE: Zarnowitz (1968 and 1979); Moore (1969).
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Turning—point errors account for only 13 percent of all errors in a collectionof
annual forecasts of real GNP, 1959—76, but they are on theaverage 2h/2_3 times larger
than other errors (Table 1, section 4).RealGNP is, of course, much more cyclical than
nominal GNP and of central importance in business—cycleanalysis and forecasting, but this
analysis still understates the importance of turning points becauseit is limited to
annualdata. Inthe present-day practice of quarterly multiperiodforecasting,
directionalerrors play a much larger and more adverse role yet, as shownby studiesof
recentU.S. forecasts(Zarnowitz, 1979, 1982).Widespread cumulative errors were
associated with missing a downturn and projecting continuedgrowth instead, as in 1973-74
and 1981, or with predicting an upturnprematurely, as in 1982.
Realisticallyjudged, annual GNP forecasts in the U.S. earn good marks;moreover,
they have improved, compared with the earlier post-WorldWar II years, in the 1960s and
even in the turbulent 1970s. However, quarterly changesbeyond the first two quarters
ahead are much more difficult to predict than theyear ahead, and here the record is
actually much worse. Errors of recent multiperiod predictions ofreal growth and
inflation show a rapid buildup beyondthe spans of 2—4quarters. Underestimation of
changeis characteristic of most forecasts, hut inperiods of unanticipated retardations
andrecessions real growth tends to he overpredicted forsome time as does the rate of
price—level change in periods of unanticipated disinflation(Zarnowitz, 1967, 1979, 1983,
1984).
I have applied tests of unbiasednegs (based onregression equations of type (1)
above) to a large set of forecasts by individualparticipants in quarterly business
outlook surveys conducted since 1968 by the znericanStatistical Association and the
National Bureau of Economic Research (ASA—NBER). Table2, column 1, shows that only about
20 percent or fewer of the forecasters fail these Ftestsat the 10 percentsignificance
levelfor five selected variables: percentagechanges in nominal GNP, real GNP, and
nominal consumer expenditures for durable goods, and levelsof the unemployment rate andthe changes in business inventories. In contrast, nearly 70 percent fail the tests for
the forecasts of inflation (rate of change in the implicit price deflator) •Moredetailed
results (Zarnowitz, 1983) would show that this contrast extends to each horizon but is
particularly sharp for the longer ones (the targets include the current quarter and the
four successive future quarters following each survey date).
Table 2, column 2, shows that about two thirds of the inflation forecasts and one—
half of the inventory investment forecasts had autocorrelated errors; the corresponding
proportions for the other variables range from 24 to 42 percent. These tests use series
of errors based exclusively on data for past predictions and realizations that were
available to participants in the successive surveys. The underlying argument is that the
forecasters could and should have used this information so as to exploit and thereby
eliminate all systematic elements in it. However, it must be noted that these
computations required creation of a comprehensive computer file of successive vintages of
the data covered. Keeping track of the many successive revisions in complex data, partic-
ularly the quarterly national income and product accounts, is not a small or low—cost
operation in which forecasters can be expected to engage routinely.
In sum, tests of the REH produce results that are predominantly negative for the
forecasts of inflation but much more favorable for those of real growth and some other
important variables. These findings are generally consistent with others reported in the
literature (Figlewski and Wachtel,1981; McNees, 1978).—19--
Table 2
Percentages of Individual Forecasts That Failed the Tests for
rinbiasedness and Serially Uncorrelated Errors, 1968—1979
Variable Percent of Forecasts with Significant
Ftests Qtests
Gross national product (GNP) 21.0 37.1
Implicit price deflator (IPD) 69.1 66.2
ON?inconstant dollars (RGNP) 20.5 27.0
Unemployment rate (UR) 15.4 42.4
Consumer expenditures for durable goods (CEDG) 14.7 23.7
Change in business inventories (CBI) 17.2 50.0
NOTE: The level of significance is 10 percent. The Ftestsare for H0:
(a, ) =(0,1), see eq. 1 and text above. These entries refer to all
individuals who participated in at least 12 of the 42quarterly surveys
conducted in the period 1968:4—1979:1 (75 for CEDG,7 each for each of
the other variables). The Box—pierce Q =n(n+ z) (n —k)p
where k= cov(u ,u)/var(u) ,testsfor the presence of autocorre
lation in the forecast errors. These entries refer to all individuals
who participated in more than 12 consecutivesurveys (18—20 depending on
the target variable).
SOURCE: ASA-NBERBusinessOutlook Survey.—20—
Inflation has been underestimated most of the time during the 1970s in both
the short and, particularly, longer forecasts. Mainly for this reason, the mean
errors are generally negative for all nominal variables covered. Theytend to be
positive for the predictions of rates of change in real GNP (and accordingly
negative for the unemployment rate), mainly because of the missed downturns in
this period of surprisingly frequent recessions and stagflation (slow growth and
high inflation) coming after a long period of prosperity in the 1960s. Thefirst
two lines in Table 3 provide a summary of the evidence for the above statements.
The most biased predictions are not necessarily the least accurate. For
example, the inflation forecasts compare favorably with the real growth forecasts
in terms of the average measures of relative accuracy and correlation between the
predicted and the actual values (Table 3, lines 3 and 4). These comparisons show
the ASA-NBER survey participants on the whole in a reasonably good light.
The group mean forecasts from a series of surveys have smaller variances of
errors and hence are on the average more accurate than most of the corresponding
forecast series of the individual participants. This is a strong conclusion,
which applies to all variables and predictive horizons covered and is consistent
with evidence for different periods and from other studies (Zarnowitz, 1967,
1984). However, a small number of the more regular survey members did perform
better in most respects than the composite forecasts (Table 3, lines 5 and 6).
As noted earlier, failures to pass tests for rationality have been blamed in
some writings on special features of this or that sample period (e.g., the
Vietnam war inflation in the 1960s; OPECandthe supply shocks in the 1970s).
Tests for the stability of coefficients (the F tests associated with Chow) have
been applied to regressions of type (1) for the individual inflation forecasts to
compare periods before and after 1974. For large majorities of the forecasters,
the hypothesis that the coefficients remained the same could not be rejected.3
30n the average across the different target quarters, the rejections
accounted for 14 and 21 percent of the forecasters at the 5% and 10% signif i-
cance levels, respectively.—21—
Table 3
Selected Statistics on the Properties and Accuracy of Individual
Forecasts from Business Outlook Surveys, 1968-1979
GNP IPD RGNP UR CEDG CBI
1. Mean of mean errors (_)a —0.1 —0.4 0.3 —0.1 —0.3 —1.7
2. Underestimates, percentb 69 96 14 64 63 79
3. Relative accuracy (Mi/Ma)C 3 5 9 .1 9 .7
4. Mean correlation (_)d 5 5 .8 .4 .5
Percent better than group:
5. Mean 20 26 22 29 24 33
6. Range 13—35 11—37 18—27 8—42 19—31 29—38
NOTE: For symbols denoting the variables, see Table 2. All measures referto
the sample of 79 individual forecasters (75 for CEDG) whoparticipated
in at least 12 surveys. They are based on thecorresponding statistics
for the five target quarters QO,... Q4(where QO denotes the survey
quarter, Q1—Q4 the four successive future quarters).
aError Cisdefined as predicted minus actual percentage change forCNP,
IPD, RGNP, and CEDG, and as predicted minus actual level for Ti?. and CBI.
= C., where is the mean error of the th individual's forecasts
i =1,.. ., n)
bpercentage of individual forecasters withmean errors that are negative.
CRatio of the average root meansquare errors of forecasts to the root mean
square value of the target series (the sum of its mean value squared and its
variance).
dr =coefficientof correlation between predicted and actual values for
the th individual, corrected for the degrees of freedom. .=
ePercentageof individual forecasts with root mean square errors
(Mi)
smaller than the corresponding root mean square errors for all forecasters who
responded to the same surveys (M j)•Meanand range refer to the percentage of
cases where Mi/Mgi < 1across he forecasts for QO, .. . Q4.
SOtJRCE:ASA-NBER Business Outlook Survey.—22—
If the government has prompter access to information andbetter forecasts
than the private sector, then its monetary stabilization policies canbe effec-
tive even in the presence of rational expectations and full priceflexibility;
otherwise, according to the same argument, agents and markets will anticipateand
neutralize all such nonrandom discretionary policies. Comparisons of theannual
January forecasts of the Council of Economic Mvisors (publishedin the Economic
Report of the President) with the more or less concurrent averageforecasts from
private surveys offer no evidence of any significant and consistent advantage on
the side of the government. Thus the mean absolute error of GNP forecastsfor
1962—68 was 1.3 percent for both the collected private predictionsand those of
the Economic Report (Zarnowitz, 1972, pp. 212—214). The median forecastsfrom
the November ASA-NBER surveys had slightly higher, those fromthe February
surveys slightly lower, mean absolute errorsthan the corresponding Economic
Report forecasts for nominal GNP growth, real GNP growth,and inflation in 1969—
76 (Moore, 1977a). It is usually not very difficult in retrospectto find
plausible reasons why some government policies proved reasonablyeffective,
others ineffective or even counterproductive. The record of the policiesis
indeed mixed and the reasons vary, including prominently errors of judgmentand
foresight hut not differences in such errors between the governmentand the
private economy.
Expectations or forecasts for the same aggregate variables are likelyto
draw upon common, publicly available information and knowledgeof certain estab-
lished techniques and models. Informal exchanges, opinion polls, predictions
publicized in the media and sold as expert advice——allthese are ways in which
forecast makers and users interact and influence each other directlyand indir-
ectly. In the process, the differences among the individual forecasts arelikely
to he reduced as many risk-averters may not wish to deviate much fromthe—23—
prevalent "consensus." Yet responsible forecasters will not simply imitate each
other but use independent judgment so that their predictions will containsome
independent information. Indeed, if simple or weighted averages of individual
forecasts result in some net gains in accuracy, as is often thecase, it is
because these forecasts are to some extent diversified.
Table 4 compares the root mean square errors of the ASA—NBERgroup
averages (M9) with the corresponding measures for forecasts from a major
corporation and two well—known econometric service bureaus(Me) The ratios
Ms/Me vary between .84 to 1 .59; when averaged across the target quarters, the
range is narrowed to .95—1.11. There is considerable variation in the detail,
but most of the ratios are close to one. IBM seems to be ahead ofDRI, hut gaps
in reporting impair comparability here. The early Wharton forecastsoften came
out before the ASA—NBER surveys (and regularly precede themid-quarter Wharton
forecasts by approximately one month), so that they are atsome informational
disadvantage. The preponderance of Me/Ms > 1(except in the case of IBM)
suggests that business economists' forecasts, which tend to be more judgmental,
compare well with the forecasts constructed with the aid of large econometric
models. However, it should be noted that thesurvey predictions benefit from the
averaging of various inputs, including those from outside and inside econometric
models (see below). To he sure, the model forecasts also includea large
component of "judgmental adjustments," which have been shown to be on theaverage
helpful. These findings are consistent with other evidence on thecomparative
accuracy of the leading corporate and econometric—model forecasters (McNees,
1975; Zarnowitz, 1979).
The participants in the ASA—NBER surveys have been asked to rankthe methods
they use, and Chart 1 sums up the evidence on the relative importance of the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































procedures labeled the "informa_ GNP model" consists of predictingthe major
expenditure components of GNP, adding these figures to obtain the overall
forecast, and checking and adjusting the results for plausibility and consis-
tency. It is an eclectic approach in which judgment typically plays a large
role, although various models of macroeconomic relationships are often employed
as well. bout three quarters of the forecasters have used it and some 50 to 60
percent ranked it first. Between 10 and 18 percent of the survey members (the
proportion has been rising) relied mainly on their own ("inside") econometric
models. bout half of all participants reported subscribing to services of
"outside" econometric models and nearly one—tenth ranked them first. Leading
indicators were ranked second by a large majority of the forecasters and used as
a complementary approach along with anticipations surveys. "Other methods"
(write—in) is a rather negligible category.
Mean forecasts and their accuracy measures were computed and compared for
three subsets of the group of the 79 "regular" participants in the ASA—NBER
surveys, namely those who ranked first the informal GNP model (INF),the inside
econometric model (INS), and the outside econometric model (OUT), respectively.
Chart 2 superimposes the series of root mean square errors of the average fore-
casts of real growth made by the groups INS and OUT (broken lines) on the corre-
sponding series for all participants (solid lines). The subscribers (OUT)
perform better most of the time and on the average than the model proprietors
(INS), particularly for QO (panel A), by smaller differentials for Q3 (panel
B). This may be explained by the fact that OUT is dominated by large corpora-
tions using well—known econometric service bureaus and their own professional
staff, whereas INS includes not only some of the leading models maintained by































































































































































































































































































Chart 3 shows for inflation forecasts what Chart 2 did for the real growth
forecasts, using the same format. Here again OUT is visibly better than INS for
QO (panel A). For the longer Q3 forecasts, however (panel B), the overall RMSE
levels are virtually the same for the two groups. (These levels are shown on
each of these graphs as the short horizontal lines labeled "means" in the right—
hand margins.)
Pdthough these differentials are apparently systematic, they are small, par-
ticularly for the longer forecasts, and of uncertain significance (cf. Zarnowitz,
1971, esp. Table 1—6). What is undoubtedly significant, even striking, are the
high correlations among these forecasts and their errors, which are clearly
demonstrated by these charts and others (not shown) for the different target
variables covered. The averages for INF, the largest group, are not plotted in
Charts 2 and 3 to avoid crowding, but their relative accuracy is high, close to
that of OUT.
Finally, Table 5 provides detail on the relative accuracy and tests of
unbiaseclness for the real growth and inflation forecasts by the participants
included in groups INS and OUT. It indicates that there is much differentiation
among the individual forecasters. The group averages conceal this diversity.
Sixteen of the 23 sources failed none of the F tests at the 5% significance
level for their real GNP growth predictions, hut only three (all in the OUT
group) can boast of the same for their inflation predictions. The ratios of the
individual to the overall group average RMS errors,Mj/Mgii mostly exceed
unity, reflecting the already noted gains from combining the forecasts, hut 21
out of the total of 46 listed Mi/Mgi ranges include one or more ratios of less
than one. The reader can locate a number of sources with excellent results for





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Recenttheoretical work in macroeconomics has directedscholarly attention
to the role of information and expectations in businesscycles, which is certain-
ly an important subject. What has been called the "rationalexpectations revolu-
tion" has stimulated much ingenious effort at
model—building and —testing, which
produced many interesting results. But the original claimson behalf of the new
"classical" models with rational expectations andcontinuous market clearing have
also encountered strong resistance by those who viewthem as greatly overstated
or implausible. More importantly, there is considerableevidence that these
models attribute to decision and policy makersmore knowledge of how the economy
works, better information and foresight, andprompter price adjustments in reac-
tion to signals of change than people can haveor make, given the complex dyna-
mics of the modern world and the irreducibleuncertainty about the future.
Cyclical turning points in aggregate measures of economicactivity more often
than not surprise even expert forecasters, whilelags in the public recognition
of such events tend to be considerablylonger yet. Early signals from leading
indicators (which are generally sensitive anderratic series that are themselves
difficult to predict) require confirmation andare sometimes ignored or disbe-
lieved even after they get it. Thespeedups and slowdowns of inflation also
usually arrive unanticipated. Indeed, the greatmajority of inflation predic-
tions since the late 1960s fail therationality tests and show a strong under-
estimation bias. This applies to bothexperts' forecasts and agents' expecta-
tions. Much less bias was found in thesurvey data for other variables of major
importance for the analysis of business cycles.
It is probable that in many cases expectational datawhich fail to meet the
strict rationality criteria in ex post tests wouldprove entirely consistent with
optimizing ex ante behavior once the consequences ofuncertainty, defective-34 -
models(knowledge), and incomplete, tardy, or costly information are taken into
account. But the concept of rational expectations in this general or weak sense
does not have the striking, definite implications of the original strong version.
Where expectations are not strictly "rational," it does not follow that they
must be merely extrapolative, regressive, or adaptive. In fact, past studies
have found that such time—series models explain statistically at best little more
than half of the variance of the expectations reported in surveys (Aiginger,
1979). My own reading of survey data is that expectations are in general neither
mere projections of the past nor flashes of intuition about the future. They are
combinations of both extrapolative and autonomous components, which vary across
individuals and change over time. The extrapolations are based on past data for
both the variable to be predicted and other related factors: expectations are
endogenous. But past developments and commitments, and current observations and
news, also have implications for the future, which economic forecasters and
agents try to extract and exploit.
Expectations matter a great deal but they are not all—important. Not all
the past is bygones. The evidence that forecasts so often underestimate economic
growth during recoveries and early expansions detracts from the hypothesis of
excessive optimism (advanced in particular by Pigou and Jhr). However, during
the late expansion stages, when the high levels of activity suggest a "boom" but
growth typically slows down, overoptimism does show up in that now the growth
prospects tend to be overassessed. This continues a fortiori in the earliest
stage of contraction as a consequence of the widespread failure to recognize the
downturn. Later, after the recession becomes evident, more of it is commonly
anticipated and expectations may turn overpessimistic for some time. If the
depressed conditions persist, these negative attitudes are likely to deepen and
become in part self—validating (Keynes' case). But normally expectations of—35—
resumed growth soon assert themselves, sometimes prematurely as in 1981. As
these observations suggest, predictions of the future almost inevitably contain
strong elements of projections of the past: extrapolation of trends, regressiv—
ity toward the "normal," partial adjustments for recent errors. Expectations
that affect the course of the economy can he presumed to he basicallyrational,
that is, to use effectively the limited available knowledge and information, hut
they are diversified and need not always be self—validating.R- 1
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